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STAYING TRUE TO NSMIA:
A ROADMAP FOR SUCCESSFUL STATE
FIDUCIARY RULES AFTER REG BI
MARIA E. VAZ FERREIRA†
INTRODUCTION
As Americans, there is hardly anything we value more than
freedom. Being “free to choose” is the core guarantee through which
we pursue our livelihood and succeed at happiness. The more
choices, the better. But what if we we are supposed to choose
blindly? In our postindustrial society, we often feel overwhelmed
by the myriad choices we must make simply to get through our
daily lives. To inform our choices, we rely on assumptions. More
importantly, we rely on each other.
Reliance is central in the world of financial investments. Financial products are increasingly complex, and investors need specialized information to choose suitable investments. In our current
economy, more than half of all families own stocks either directly
or indirectly as part of a fund, and many resort to the services of a
financial services professional.1 Americans place their hopes for
economic progress and stability on financial advisers, who can be
broker dealers (“BDs”), investment advisers (“IAs”), money managers, investment consultants, financial planners, general partners of hedge funds, and many others who get paid for giving
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Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RSRV. BULL., Sept. 2017, at 1, 20,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/scf17.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FVFAUHM].
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personalized securities advice.2 However, investors largely ignore
that most of these professionals are not required to disclose all
conflicts of interest, or to put their own interests aside when
making recommendations.3 Only registered investment advisers
must adhere to this fiduciary standard, and the consequences to
investors can be devastating.4
Traditionally, the role of BDs was limited to executing securities transactions for a transaction fee, and IAs provided ongoing
account management and investment advice for a fixed percentage
of managed assets.5 Today, however, the differences between
traditional BDs and IAs are not so clear-cut.6 BDs now offer a wide
spectrum of services and products, including investment advice
and recommendations, both to institutional and retail investors.7
Some BDs are also registered as IAs, which allows their representatives to act as IAs for some of a client’s accounts and as BDs for
that client’s other accounts.8 Investors often do not distinguish
between BDs and IAs, but they do expect to receive honest,
unconflicted advice from financial professionals they trust.9
However, BD compensation and incentive structures may
prompt their representatives to recommend the investments that
will pay the broker the most.10 Thus, BDs often recommend highfee, high-yield investments, but fail to inform their clients of how
2

Investment Adviser, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/investing-basics/glossary/investment-adviser [https://perma.cc/S4MH-9UYJ]
(last visited Jan. 2, 2021).
3
Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n (“PIABA”), Comment Letter on Draft Fiduciary Duty
Regulations 2–3 (Mar. 1, 2019), https://piaba.org/system/files/2019-03/Comment
%20Letter%20%28March%201%202019%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SDM-FCJN]; see
also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER‐
DEALERS 101 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CKV8-XXP5].
4
Christine Lazaro, The Future of Financial Advice: Eliminating the False
Distinction Between Brokers and Investment Advisers, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 381, 382
(2013); Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. IA-5248, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,669, 36,671 (July 12, 2019).
5
Lazaro, supra note 4, at 398.
6
Id. at 382.
7
Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should
Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 711 (2012); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra
note 3, at 8.
8
Lazaro, supra note 4, at 412.
9
Andrew Osterland, Is Your Advisor a Fiduciary? Chances Are, You Have No
Idea, CNBC: ADVICE & THE ADVISOR (Jun. 17, 2015, 9:08 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2015/06/16/is-your-advisor-a-fiduciary-chances-are-you-have-no-idea.html [https://
perma.cc/K69F-SSPZ].
10
Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-86031, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318, 33,426 (July 12, 2019).
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risky and illiquid these products are.11 Focusing on their own interests, BDs can cause investors to suffer losses from which they
may not recover, by investing in high‐risk products, accelerating
their retirement, or withdrawing their defined benefit pension as
a lump sum.12
Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
approved Regulation Best Interest (“Reg BI”), a package of rulemakings and interpretations designed to protect retail investors
while preserving their ability to choose the services and compensation structure that better serve their needs.13 Regulation BI
sought to set a clearer standard of BD conduct. However, the new
standard falls short of what many investor advocates, and even
the SEC, had previously deemed necessary.14 Some state legislators have responded by proposing rules that bring the fiduciary
duties of those BDs who provide investment advice in line with the
duties of care and loyalty imposed on IAs by the common law.15
Industry actors oppose these state efforts and argue that the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”)16
preempts state efforts in this field.17 This Note argues that
NSMIA does not necessarily preempt state regulations imposing
fiduciary duties on BDs. While it is true that NSMIA sets bounda-

11

Christine Lazaro, President, PIABA, Statement Before the New Jersey Bureau
of Securities (Nov. 19, 2018), https://piaba.org/system/files/2018-11/Statement%20of
%20Christine%20Lazaro%20NJ%20Bureau%20of%20Securities%20Nov%2019%20
2018_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3HQ-4794].
12
PIABA, supra note 3, at 7.
13
See generally Regulation Best Interest, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15l–1 (2020).
14
See, e.g., James Lundy & Robert Mancuso, Seven States and D.C. Aggressively
Challenge Reg BI, JD SUPRA (Sept. 11 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
seven-states-and-d-c-aggressively-76074/ [https://perma.cc/N3BS-BT3M]; U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 3, at 101.
15
See, e.g., Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers, and Agents,
51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (proposed April 15, 2019) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 13:47A-6.3, 4); Amendments to the Standard of Conduct Applicable to BrokerDealers and Agents (notice of adoption Feb. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 950 MASS.
CODE REGS. 12.200) [hereinafter Mass. Adopting Release], https://www.sec.state.ma
.us/sct/sctfiduciaryconductstandard/Adopting-Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM7V37W9]; Notice of Draft Regulations and Request for Comment (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=6156 [https://perma.cc/37ZL-QKY9].
16
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
17
Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n (“SIFMA”), Comment Letter on Regulation Best
Interest (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-18/s70718-5263945183727.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQJ6-3YZG].
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ries to state regulatory authority over BD conduct, it also provides
a roadmap for the states to successfully avoid preemption.18
This Note is divided into five parts. Part I describes the historical landscape of securities laws and regulations. Part II addresses NSMIA’s purpose, and the allocation of duties between the
states and the federal government. Part III analyzes whether
NSMIA preempts state fiduciary rules governing BDs who give
investment advice. Part IV argues that state fiduciary rules can
avoid preemption by successfully balancing the competing purposes of NSMIA, avoiding vague language, and imposing a scope
of duties that is consistent with common law precedent. Part V
offers policy arguments supporting state regulation of BD conduct
affecting retail consumers.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

History of Securities Regulation

Today, the professionals who carry out securities transactions
and provide financial advice to investors must comply with several
layers of regulation: federal laws, state laws, federal rules such as
those adopted by the SEC, state rules, and rules of self-regulatory
organizations such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).19
This multilayered system of regulation first emerged when
the federal government entered the field of securities regulation,
which, up until that point, the states had been regulating for
almost two decades.20 In 1917, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided the Blue Sky Cases and held that state “blue-sky
laws . . . did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment” and did not
“unduly burden interstate commerce.”21 With the onset of the
Great Depression, Congress saw the need to intervene and enacted
the first federal securities laws.22 Congress first centered its regulatory efforts on issuers and enacted the Securities Act of 1933
(“1933 Act”).23 Next, it focused on brokers. With the Securities
18

Can State Laws One-Up SEC’s Regulation Best Interest?, LAW360 (Nov. 13,
2019, 4:34 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1219205 (subscription required).
19
Lazaro, supra note 4, at 381.
20
Evan J. Leitch, The Antifraud Savings Clause of the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1769, 1771–72 (2009).
21
Id. at 1772–73.
22
Lazaro, supra note 4, at 381.
23
Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
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Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”),24 Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).25 By then, forty-seven of
the then existing forty-eight states had adopted their own blue-sky
statutes.26 According to the SEC, the broad purposes of national
securities laws “can be reduced to two common-sense notions”:
(1) “[c]ompanies offering securities for sale to the public must tell
the truth about their business, the securities they are selling, and
the risks involved in investing in those securities”; and (2) “[t]hose
who sell and trade securities—brokers, dealers, and exchanges—
must treat investors fairly and honestly.”27 Soon after, Congress
passed the Maloney Act of 1938,28 which amended the Exchange
Act to entrust a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) with making
the rules necessary to discipline member misconduct and ensure
market integrity and investor protection.29 That SRO is now
known as FINRA.30 When Congress enacted the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”),31 BDs were already regulated by
both the SEC and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(“NASD”), FINRA’s predecessor.32 The 1940 Act provides a comprehensive framework for regulating federally registered IAs and
expressly excludes BDs.33 These are some of the historical reasons
why the conduct of BDs and IAs is governed by separate regulatory
schemes.34

24

Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
25
15 U.S.C. § 78d (2018).
26
Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing
Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 229 (2003).
27
The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/investing-basics/role-sec [https://perma.cc/23DU-PKUR] (last visited Jan. 2,
2021).
28
Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
29
The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry: Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/rolesec/laws-govern-securities-industry#invadvact1940 [https://perma.cc/8BW3-T4U4] (last
visited Jan. 2, 2021).
30
Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 402 (2010).
31
Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
32
Laby, supra note 30, at 402.
33
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2, 80b-6 (2018).
34
See infra Section I.B.
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Congress did not intend that federal laws occupy the entire
field of securities regulation.35 However, the financial services industry grew rapidly, and its participants brought the issue of inefficent, overlapping regulations to Congress’ attention.36 NSMIA
was enacted to address the inefficiencies of duplicative federal and
state regulations, and to promote “efficiency, competition and
capital formation” in addition to investor protection.37
After NSMIA, the federal government enacted several additional statutes governing the securities industry. In 1998, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(“SLUSA”),38 which preempted private securities class actions
against nationally traded securities.39 In 2002, Congress enacted
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOA”),40 which sought to foster corporate
responsibility in financial disclosures and to combat corporate
fraud, especially in accounting. Another major securities upheaval took place on July 21, 2010, with the passage of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”).41 Dodd-Frank’s explicit goal was to “promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, . . . to protect the American
taxpayer . . . , [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices.”42 Particularly, Dodd-Frank authorized the SEC
to (1) conduct a study on the effectiveness of the existing standards
of care for BDs and IAs and (2) promulgate rules to harmonize
these standards.43 The SEC exercised this authority when it
adopted Reg BI.44

35

Christopher H. Pierce-Wright, State Equity Crowdfunding and Investor
Protection, 91 WASH. L. REV. 847, 866 (2016); Leitch, supra note 20, at 1773–74.
36
Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs., 104th Cong. 30–31 (1996) (testimony of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, U.S. Securities Exchange Commission).
37
15 U.S.C § 77b(b).
38
Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
39
Id. at 3228.
40
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2018)
and in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
41
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1824–30.
44
Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86031, 84 Fed. Reg.
33,318, 33,329–30 (July 12, 2019).
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B. Dual System of Laws Governing Conduct of BDs and IAs
1.

Federal Regulation of BD and IA Conduct

On a federal level, two separate regulatory regimes govern
BDs and IAs: (1) the 1940 Act governs IA conduct; and (2) the 1934
Act governs BD conduct.45 Congress charged the SEC with implementing the regulatory framework governing both BDs and
IAs, and the SEC delegated regulatory authority over BDs to
FINRA, which it supervises.46
The separate frameworks governing BDs and IAs led to the
evolution of distinct fiduciary standards.47 IAs are subject to broad
fiduciary standards per the antifraud provisions of the 1940 Act,48
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc.49 In Capital Gains, the Court held that
Congress recognized IAs as fiduciaries, subject to an “affirmative
duty of ‘utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of material
facts,’ ” and a duty “ ‘to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading’ [their] clients.”50 The Court also found that Congress intended
to codify fraud broadly—as developed by the courts in the common
law51—and that an IA’s failure to disclose material facts, even
without intent to deceive, was enforceable as fraud under the 1940
Act.52 The SEC subsequently defined the scope of IA fiduciary
duties, which currently includes: (1) acting in “the best interest of
the client”; (2) “seek[ing] best execution”; (3) providing ongoing
“advice and monitoring”; (4) fully disclosing material facts about
prospective investments; (5) learning about the client’s goals and
needs; (6) never “subordinat[ing] its clients’ interests to its own”;
(7) fully “disclos[ing] all conflicts of interest” when giving advice;
and (8) describing all fees related to an investment.53
BDs, on the other hand, are not fiduciaries under federal law.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that the
1934 Act does not confer a fiduciary duty on BDs because unlike
the 1940 Act, the antifraud section of the 1934 Act requires scien45

Lazaro, supra note 4, at 390, 392.
Id. at 381–82.
47
Id. at 394.
48
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2018).
49
375 U.S. 180 (1963).
50
Id. at 194.
51
Id. at 195.
52
Id. at 194–95.
53
See Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. IA-5248, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,669, 36,672–78 (July 12, 2019).
46
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ter.54 Instead, BDs were traditionally subject to the “suitability”
standard as defined and enforced by FINRA, now replaced by the
Reg BI standard adopted by the SEC.55
Reg BI requires brokers to act in the “best interest” of the
customer when recommending securities transactions or investment strategies to retail customers.56 Reg BI limits BDs’ duties of
care and loyalty to the duration of the particular transactions they
are executing, and although the “best interest” standard adopted
in Reg BI is higher than the “suitability” standard, it does not
match the “best interest” duty applicable to fiduciaries under the
common law.57 Instead, the SEC lists a series of requirements that
BDs can meet to satisfy the Reg BI “best interest” standard, which
closely resembles the preexisting suitability standard required by
FINRA.58 To protect investors, Reg BI mandates that BDs always
place their clients’ interests ahead of their own.59 Reg BI relies
heavily on disclosures, which require that BDs and IAs furnish
their clients with a disclosure form called “Form CRS Relationship
Summary.”60 However, Reg BI does not require complete disclosure or elimination of all conflicts.61 Simply put, it leaves the onus
54

425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
FINRA, RULE 2111(a) (2020). The rule outlines the three main suitability obligations: reasonable-basis, customer-specific, and quantitative suitability. It requires
that a BD or BD representative “have a reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or securities is
suitable for the customer, based on the information obtained through the reasonable
diligence of the [BD or BD representative] or associated person to ascertain the
customer’s investment profile.” Id. A customer’s investment profile would include
factors such as “age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status,
investment objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity
needs and risk tolerance.” FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) FAQ, FINRA, https://
www.finra.org/rules-guidance/key-topics/suitability/faq [https://perma.cc/3TS9-V97L]
(last visited Jan. 2, 2021). The rule includes an exemption for institutional customers.
Id.
56
Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86031, 84 Fed. Reg.
33,318, 33,321 (July 12, 2019).
57
Jessica Kinslow, Regulation Best Interest: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
ADVOCATE, Oct. 2019, at 22, 22.
58
Jacob Crawley, State-Specific Fiduciary Duties and Regulating Financial Advice in the Future, 25 PIABA B.J. 411, 431–32 (2018); see also PIABA, Comment Letter
on Proposed Fiduciary Conduct Standard for Broker-Dealers, Agents, Investment Advisers, and Investment Adviser Representatives (July 26, 2019), https://piaba.org/
piaba-newsroom/comment-letter-proposed-amendments-massachusetts-950-cmrsections-requiring-broker [https://perma.cc/3J8A-KMWE].
59
17 C.F.R. § 240.15l–1(a)(1) (2020).
60
Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-86032, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-5247, 84 Fed. Reg.
33,492, 33,493 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 240, 248, 275, 279).
61
Regulation Best Interest, 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,388–89.
55
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on the investor to read the fine print, and directs companies to
make the fine print bigger. Reg BI also gives wide latitude to BDs
providing securities advice. The 1940 Act establishes that BDs
who give advice that is “solely incidental” to a securities transaction are not subject to the duties imposed on IAs, and Reg BI
defines “solely incidental” as any advice given “in connection with
and . . . reasonably related to the broker-dealer’s primary business
of effecting securities transactions.”62
BDs must also satisfy the extensive recordkeeping and
monitoring requirements under Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act,63
and its corresponding SEC regulations under Rule 17a.64 Additionally, FINRA can enforce Rule 17a and impose its own recordkeeping requirements. FINRA’s recordkeeping rules include:
(1) Rule 2210,65 requiring BDs to retain records of all communications with retail customers; (2) Rule 4511,66 mandating compliance
with federal and FINRA books and records requirements; (3) Rule
4530,67 imposing a duty to report certain disciplinary and legal
matters; and (4) Rule 3110,68 establishing supervision requirements. Rule 3110 requires BDs to implement a written supervisory system to ensure that everyone associated with the firm
complies with all regulations applicable to BDs, and the rule
requires that BDs retain books and records documenting compliance with the firm’s inspection and supervision duties.69
Therefore, any additional rule imposed on a BD, regardless of
whether the rule requires recordkeeping per se, would indirectly
create a duty to keep records of compliance through FINRA Rule
3110.
In sum, the key differences between the scope of the fiduciary
duties applicable to BDs and those applicable to IAs are: (1) that
while IAs have an ongoing duty of care and monitoring, the duty
of care imposed on BDs ends when the transaction ends; and
(2) that the standard of required disclosures under the duty of

62

Commission Interpretation Regarding the Solely Incidental Prong of the
Broker-Dealer Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Adviser, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. IA-5249, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,681, 33,685 (July 12, 2019) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276).
63
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2018).
64
17 C.F.R § 240.17a–1 (2020).
65
FINRA, RULE 2210 (2019).
66
FINRA, RULE 4511 (2011).
67
FINRA, RULE 4530 (2020).
68
FINRA, RULE 3110(b)(1), (7) (2020).
69
Id.
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loyalty is higher for IAs. The actual effect of disclosures and
investor protections afforded by Reg BI will be further defined by
FINRA, the states, and the courts through future implementation.
2.

Regulation of BD and IA Conduct at the State Level

States typically have strong antifraud rules mirroring federal
standards, and their role in policing fraud has not diminished
since the passage of NSMIA.70 States interpret their antifraud
statutes broadly,71 and some state statutes do not require scienter
in civil securities-fraud enforcement actions.72 Although federal
antifraud provisions do not recognize a private right of action for IA
misconduct, their state counterparts often do.73 Prior to NSMIA,
most states already had rules targeting dishonest and unethical
conduct of BDs and IAs74—some modeled after the Dishonest or
Unethical Business Practices Model Rules promulgated in 1983 by
the North American Securities Administrators Association
(“NASAA”).75 Some states have defined BD unethical conduct very
broadly, giving state enforcement agencies great latitude to find
violations, even if the conduct found to transgress the state statute
is permitted under federal statutes.76
Overall, states have construed federal standards as a
baseline, and have enhanced regulation of BD and IA conduct to
address new fraudulent and unethical schemes affecting their
70

Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Role of Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the
Jobs Act, 66 DUKE L.J. 605, 618–19 (2016).
71
See, e.g., People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38–39 (N.Y. 1926)
(holding that the word “fraud” under New York’s antifraud statute, the Martin Act,
should “be given a wide meaning” and include all deceitful or misleading acts that
come within the purpose of the law, regardless of intent to harm or defraud); People
v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271, 1286 (Cal. 1995) (authorizing enforcement actions under
California’s antifraud statute even where an “offeror was unaware that his or her
sales pitch was misleading”); People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, 95 A.D.3d 474, 482–
83 (1st Dep’t 2012), aff’d, 21 N.Y.3d 439 (N.Y. 2013).
72
See Foster v. Alex, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
73
See AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., SURVEY OF STATE INVESTMENT ADVISER LAWS 31
(1999), https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/d15130_invest.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9PJA-WEMY].
74
Id. at 26–27. See also CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 36b-31-15b (2020); IOWA ADMIN.
CODE r. 191-50.16(502) (2020); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 30-51.170 (2020).
75
Compare 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.204 (2020), with MODEL RULE, DISHONEST
OR UNETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS AND AGENTS (N. AM. SEC.
ADM’RS ASS’N 1983), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/29-Dishonest
_Practices_of_BD_or_Agent.83.pdf [https://perma.cc/42B9-54QB].
76
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25216 (West 2020) (“The commissioner shall, for
the purposes of this subdivision, by rule define such schemes, devices or contrivances
as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.”).
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citizens. State statutes of this kind have not been preempted, and
investors have continued to rely on states’ statutory causes of
action for relief.77
3.

BD Fiduciary Duties Under the Common Law

State efforts to impose statutory fiduciary duties on BDs are
new, but these duties have been long recognized under the
common law. The scope of BD fiduciary duties under the common
law depends on the nature of the agency relationship.78 In Leib v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the court recognized
three different scenarios: (1) where the BD has discretion over a
client’s account; (2) where the account is nondiscretionary, and the
client makes the trading decisions; and (3) where the BD has de
facto control over a nondiscretionary account.79 When a BD is handling a discretionary account, he becomes a full-fledged fiduciary,
owing a duty of loyalty, due care, and utmost good faith.80 If the
customer has a nondiscretionary account with the broker, the BD
has a limited duty “to serve his customer’s financial interest
within the framework of a single transaction only.”81 The third
scenario is the special circumstances scenario. In this scenario,
the court will look at the client’s sophistication, the degree of trust
and confidence in the relationship, and other special circumstances to determine whether the client was sufficiently informed
and involved in his account so as to have “retained control.”82 The
courts will analyze the facts and circumstances of each case, and
a BD’s broad advice regarding investment decisions and strategies, upon which the customer has frequently relied, can be a
strong indication that the account is discretionary.83
However, some state courts have gone even further, holding
BDs of nondiscretionary trading accounts to broad fiduciary
duties. In Holmes v. Grubman,84 the Georgia Supreme Court
77

Yokell v. Draper, No. 18-CV-02124, 2018 WL 3417514, at *2, *8–9 (N.D. Cal.
July 13, 2018).
78
Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 723 (2010).
79
461 F. Supp. 951, 952–54 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981).
80
Id. at 953.
81
Id. at 952.
82
Id. at 954–55.
83
Ron A. Rhoades, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Defining the Term “Fiduciary” 41 & n. 97 (Apr. 12, 2011), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-andregulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB32/posthearing00030.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82Q4-NHUX].
84
691 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 2010).
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stated that “[a] stock broker’s duty to account to its customer is
fiduciary in nature, so that the broker is obligated to exercise the
utmost good faith.”85 California courts have also found that BDs
are fiduciaries of their clients and that BDs have “the duty to act
in the highest good faith toward the customer.”86 The California
Court of Appeals noted that a fiduciary duty always exists in a
broker-customer relationship, and that the real issue is determining the scope of the fiduciary obligation, which depends on the
facts of the case.87
II. NSMIA’S ROLE IN THE SECURITIES REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
A.

NSMIA’s General Purpose

NSMIA amended federal securities laws to “promote efficiency
and capital formation in the financial markets, and . . . to promote
more efficient management of mutual funds, protect investors, and
provide more effective and less burdensome regulation.”88 Congress did not intend to sacrifice investor protection for efficiency;
its concern was that the existing dual system burdened the
national industry “without providing commensurate protection to
investors or to our markets.”89
To achieve its dual goal, NSMIA chose to “reallocat[e] responsibility over the regulation of the nation’s securities markets in a
more logical fashion between the Federal government and the
states.”90 First, Congress preempted state regulation in (1) “offerings of securities by mutual funds”; (2) “offerings by companies
traded on a national securities exchange”; and (3) “exempt offerings under Rule 506,”91 and it also gave the SEC discretion to
expand preemption by defining “qualified purchasers.”92 Second,
Congress deliberately preserved the states’ ability to bring antifraud enforcement actions against covered BDs and IAs operating

85
Id. at 201 (quoting Minor v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 409 S.E.2d 262, 264 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1991)).
86
Apollo Cap. Fund, LLC v. Roth Cap. Partners, LLC, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 199, 215
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Duffy v. Cavalier, 215 Cal. Rptr. 740, 752 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989)).
87
Id. at 215–16.
88
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C).
89
H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 39 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
90
Id. at 39–40.
91
Campbell, supra note 70, at 614.
92
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2018).
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within their borders.93 Congress wanted states to continue “protect[ing] investors through application of state antifraud laws.”94
B. The Arguments for and Against State Preemption in the
Current Debate
Investor advocates and some state regulators believe that
NSMIA does not preempt state-specific fiduciary regulations, as
shown by NSMIA’s savings clause95 and Congress’s acquiescence
in the historical development of state laws in the field.96 They
argue that state fiduciary regulations are necessary because the
existing standards do not match investors’ expectations and do not
effectively protect them against losses caused by BD conflicts of
interests,97 churning in senior citizen’s brokerage accounts, sales
of unsuitable products, and inadequate supervision of BD’s agents’
activities, among others.98 They argue that Reg BI and other
federal standards should be interpreted as a “floor, not a ceiling.”99
On the other hand, industry advocates argue that NSMIA
preempts these regulations100 because: (1) NSMIA preempts state
books and records requirements; and (2) BDs would inevitably
need to maintain books and records to show compliance with the
new fiduciary standard.101 For example, through the operation of

93

See infra Section III.A.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 40.
95
15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1); see also infra text accompanying note 123.
96
Crawley, supra note 58, at 422–25; Comment Letter for NASAA as Amicus Curiae
Supporting the Massachusetts Securities Division, Fidelity Brokerage Servs., LLC, at
7, Docket No. E-2015-0078 (Mar. 30, 2017) [hereinafter NASAA Amicus Letter], https://
www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NASAA-Amicus-Letter-Massachusetts-330-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6LL-BHM5].
97
See, e.g., Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers, and Agents,
51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (proposed Apr. 15, 2019) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 13:47A-6.3, 4).
98
Investment Products and Sales Practices Commonly Used to Defraud Seniors:
Stories from the Front Line, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
seniors/elderfraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF6J-Z5RT] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021).
99
Robert J. Jackson Jr., Statement on Final Rules Governing Investment Advice,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-jackson-060519-iabd [https://perma.cc/NP2N-LM68].
100
SIFMA, Comment Letter on Massachuesetts Securities Division’s Proposed
Fiduciary Conduct Standard 15–17 (July 26, 2019), https://www.sifma.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/SIFMA-Comments-on-MA-Fiduciary-Proposal-July-26-2019
.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4V7-A2RW].
101
Id.; see also SIFMA et al., Comment Letter on Massachusetts Securities Division’s Proposed Fiduciary Conduct Standard 6 (July 26, 2019), https://www.sifma.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Joint-Trade-Association-Letter-on-MA-Fiduciary-ProposalJuly-26-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9U5-WSDD].
94
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rules such as FINRA 3110, firms would have to keep documents to
prove whether they made “reasonable inquiries into the risks,
costs and conflicts of interest” related to a recommendation.102 To
weather additional legal exposure and compliance costs, some BDs
would need to reduce the number of BD representatives operating
in the state or pass the costs to investors, limiting access to the
cheaper, transaction-based advice that benefits investors who
cannot afford the services of an IA.103 Both the SEC and the
financial services industry believe that the Reg BI package is more
than a new suitability standard, and that it adds meaningful
protections for investors while preserving their ability to choose
the financial services and products that better suit their needs.104
They also contend that the balkanized fiduciary standard would
further confuse investors, so it would unnecessarily disrupt capital
markets without bringing added benefits to investors, contrary to
NSMIA’s explicit purpose.105
The industry presented these arguments when the SEC was
considering Reg BI,106 and urged the SEC to preempt state
regulatory initiatives, but the SEC declined.107 It stated that
“[w]hether Regulation Best Interest would have a preemptive
effect on any state law would be determined in future judicial
proceedings, and would depend on the language and operation of
the particular state law at issue” and on whether that language is
“the type of law, rule, or regulation that is expressly preempted by
the securities law or impliedly preempted under principles applied
by courts.”108

102
David Libowsky & Daniel Strashun, N.J. Fiduciary Rule Would Add to Investment Firms’ Burdens, LAW360 (May 1, 2019, 3:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1153679/nj-fiduciary-rule-would-add-to-investment-firms-burdens (subscription required).
103
SIFMA, supra note 100, at 1, 13.
104
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules and Interpretations To Enhance Protections and Preserve Choice for Retail Investors in Their
Relationships with Financial Professionals (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press-release/2019-89 [https://perma.cc/UW2T-2ASF]; SIFMA, supra note 100, at 4–5.
105
SIFMA, supra note 100, at 2.
106
SIFMA, supra note 17, at 2–4.
107
Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86031, 84 Fed. Reg.
33,318, 33,327, 33,435 n.1163 (July 12, 2019).
108
Id. at 33,435 n.1163 (emphasis added).
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III. PREEMPTION OF STATE REGULATIONS IMPOSING
COMMON LAW FIDUCIARY DUTIES ON BDS WHO
PROVIDE INVESTMENT ADVICE
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
states that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,”109
and it is well established that “state law that conflicts with federal
law is ‘without effect.’ ”110 However, the analysis of issues arising
under the Supremacy Clause “start[s] with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded
by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.”111
“Congress has the constitutional power to preempt state
law . . . expressly—through clear statutory language—or implicitly.”112 Implicit preemption can take the form of either field or
conflict preemption.113 Courts find field preemption when they establish that it was Congress’s intention to occupy an entire field of
regulations.114 Conflict preemption occurs in cases where federal
law is in conflict with state law, because the contradictions that
would result imply Congress’s intent to preempt state law.115
Federal law is in conflict with state law if a party’s compliance
with both federal and state requirements is impossible or if,
considering “the federal statute’s purpose and intended effects,
state law poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s
objectives.”116
In sum, congressional purpose is the “ultimate touchstone” in
every preemption case.117 Consequently, the analysis must look at
the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole, both through
its text and through a “reasoned understanding of the way in
which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law.”118
109

U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
111
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
112
Whistler Invs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159, 1164
(9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
118
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996).
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Express Preemption

The plain language of NSMIA’s express preemption clause is
the starting point of any inquiry.119 Where the statute contains an
express preemption clause, the Court does not focus on the
presumption against preemption but on “the plain wording of the
clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’
pre-emptive intent.”120
With regards to BDs, NSMIA preempts state regulations that
impose books and records requirements in addition to those
established by federal law.121 The BD state law exemption reads:
No law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action
of any State or political subdivision thereof shall establish
capital, custody, margin, financial responsibility, making and
keeping records, bonding, or financial or operational reporting
requirements for brokers, dealers, municipal securities dealers,
government securities brokers, or government securities dealers
that differ from, or are in addition to, the requirements in those
areas established under this chapter.122

However, there is a zone of activity reserved for the states.
NSMIA’s “savings clause” states that:
Consistent with this section, the securities commission (or any
agency or office performing like functions) of any State shall
retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and
bring enforcement actions, in connection with securities or
securities transactions
(A) with respect to—
(i) fraud or deceit; or
(ii) unlawful conduct by a broker, dealer, or funding
portal . . . .123

It is important to note that the savings clause authorizes
enforcement actions for BD “unlawful conduct” in addition to fraud
and deceit.124 If every word and every provision of the statute is to
be given effect, “unlawful conduct” must mean that the state’s
enforcement authority includes some other type of conduct beyond
mere fraud or deceit.125

119
120
121
122
123
124
125

See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016).
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(1) (2018).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 77r(c)(1) (emphasis added).
Id.
See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988).
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No other provisions within NSMIA define these terms and
their scope.126 However, the text, history, and purpose of the
savings clause, as well as state interpretations through enforcement, establish that the intent of Congress was to leave the state’s
power to define and proscribe unlawful conduct broadly, just as
they had before NSMIA.127
The clause’s title is “Preservation of authority,” and it emphasizes that states “shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such
State to investigate and bring enforcement actions.”128 The plain
language of the statute shows that Congress intended to preserve
the states’ preexisting laws with respect to BD fraudulent or
otherwise unlawful conduct.
Legislative history supports this broad reading of the statute.
The House Report emphasizes that the statute did not intend to
“alter, limit, expand, or otherwise affect in any way any State
statutory or common law with respect to fraud or deceit, including
broker-dealer sales practices, in connection with securities or
securities transactions.”129 This language unambiguously extends
to covered securities.130 Additionally, in the House Conference Report, Congress noted that the “preservation of authority is intended to permit state securities regulators to continue to exercise
their police power to prevent fraud and broker-dealer sales practice
abuses, such as churning accounts or misleading customers.”131
Congress left the states free to apply their own antifraud
statutes, knowing that states could modify and expand those
statutes.132 NSMIA’s plain language left the states free to “define
their antifraud standards as they saw fit and to enforce their own
sets of regulatory rules.”133 This is significant because some states’
antifraud statutes offer broader protections than the federal
standard.134 The savings clause preserves the state investigative
and enforcement authority “[c]onsistent with this section,”135
which means that state powers are preserved as long as they are
126
Linda M. Stevens, Comment, The National Securities Markets Improvement
Act (NSMIA) Savings Clause: A New Challenge to Regulatory Uniformity, 38 U. BALT.
L. REV. 445, 454 (2009).
127
NASAA Amicus Letter, supra note 96, at 7.
128
15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (emphasis added).
129
H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 34 (1996).
130
Id. at 33–34.
131
H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 40 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
132
H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 33–34.
133
Leitch, supra note 20, at 1783.
134
See supra Section I.B.2.
135
15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (2018).
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not expressly preempted by the statute. Congress was aware that
giving states the discretion to apply their own antifraud statutes
could defeat the purposes of NSMIA, because states could try to
circumvent federal preemption by indirectly imposing requirements on issuers of covered securities.136 Congress intended to
avoid that result and required state enforcement actions to be
“grounded in conduct other than that which states are expressly
preempted from regulating more generally.”137 However, Congress
also considered that in some cases a legitimate enforcement action
under a state’s antifraud laws could be an adequate basis for incidentally stepping into preempted territory.138
Thus, NSMIA distinguishes regulation of disclosure language
at the point of issuance—a federal issue—from BD conduct at the
point of sale, where client interaction occurs—a federal and state
issue.139 Under this regime, states would be expressly preempted
from enacting regulations intended to impose additional books and
records requirements on BDs,140 but the states’ antifraud jurisdiction would still allow states to reach conduct of BD representatives
who are violating the antifraud statutes of the states where they
operate.141
Recent court decisions also support the premise that states’
antifraud enforcement jurisdiction can be legitimate even if it
incidentally encroaches on federal territory. In Capital Research
& Management Co. v. Brown,142 the California Attorney General
brought an enforcement action for BD fraud based on additional
compensation payments made to the BDs, which were not adequately disclosed in a fund’s offering documents.143 The undisclosed compensation was the result of shelf-space agreements,
which are permitted under federal law.144 The Court reasoned that
the enforcement action fell within NSMIA’s express preemption
provisions because the state was “indirectly” requiring additional
disclosures on offering documents of covered securities—namely,
136

Stevens, supra note 126, at 455–56; Leitch, supra note 20, at 1783.
Stevens, supra note 126, at 467–68 (emphasis added).
138
H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 34 (1996).
139
Id.
140
15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(1).
141
Stevens, supra note 126, at 467–68.
142
53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
143
Id. at 773.
144
Id. at 773–774. Shelf space agreements are contracts where BDs give preferential treatment to certain fund companies in exchange for payment by the fund.
Client Commission Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 34-52635, 70 Fed. Reg.
61,700, 61,709 n.111 (Oct. 25, 2005).
137
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mutual fund shares.145 However, the court found that the action
“just as plainly” came within NSMIA’s savings clause.146 After
considering NSMIA’s language, purpose and legislative history,
the Brown court was persuaded that “Congress intended to
preserve the states’ anti-fraud authority to control the conduct of
brokers and dealers, notwithstanding that the exercise of such
controls might prospectively influence the disclosures made by a
covered security.”147 The court held that enforcement actions that
(1) are “brought by a state officer” on behalf of “a securities commission” (2) under state law (3) “with regard to fraud and deceit”
(4) “in connection with covered [securities and] securities transactions” are “squarely within the ambit of the savings clause.”148
The court’s holding is relevant in several ways. First, it allows
state enforcement actions that indirectly affect preempted regulation areas. Second, it expressly commits enforcement actions triggered by BD statements to the laws of the state. Third, it allows
for a broad interpretation of a state’s antifraud statute, encompassing conduct that was not expressly identified as unlawful by
any “state or federal law, rule or regulation.”149 Fourth, it illustrates the broad scope of conduct subject to enforcement under a
state’s antifraud provisions. The court reasoned that the legality
of these shelf-space agreements was not in question, but that the
adviser’s and distributor’s intentional failure to disclose them had
the effect of hampering the client’s understanding of the statements contained in the fund’s disclosure documents.150 Therefore,
the misconduct was enforceable under the state’s statutes as an
inducement to buy the fund’s shares “by means of manipulative,
deceptive, and otherwise fraudulent contrivances.”151 Last, the
court held that the Attorney General’s action challenging the
conduct of a covered broker dealer “cannot be reasonably construed as an effort to regulate a non-party issuer,” suggesting that
the intention of the state regulator may be relevant to the express
preemption analysis.152 The court in Brown concluded by holding
that “[t]he savings clause is sufficiently broad to permit this

145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 775.
Id. at 775–76.
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id. at 772–73.
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id. at 777.
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action, and as applied to this case is entirely consistent with the
purpose of NSMIA.”153
Brown was one of many actions brought by the California
Attorney General immediately following the passage of a California law giving him “unusually broad latitude to prosecute corporate conduct,” including “inadequate disclosure of shelf-space
agreements.”154 In People v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,155 where the
plaintiff sued a national brokerage firm for failing to adequately
disclose shelf-space agreements incentivizing the firm to recommend certain mutual funds, the court held that neither NSMIA
nor the applicable federal rule preempted the state from enforcing
their broadly defined antifraud statutes.156 In Papic v. Burke,157
the court cited Brown and stated that “[t]he State’s authority to
enforce its laws under [the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act],
in connection with fraud and/or with material omissions which
would mislead investors in connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of securities, remains intact.”158
To conclude, even though the language of NSMIA does not expressly address whether the states have jurisdiction to impose
fiduciary duties on covered BDs, courts have consistently embraced the argument that NSMIA did not “interfere with states’
ability to protect their citizens from fraud, or to implement greater
protections from fraudulent activities than the federal law
provides.”159
B. Implied Preemption
Courts give special value to Congress’s express statements of
preemption, but the inquiry does not end there: If “the question is
whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of
the statute must be considered, and that which . . . must be implied
is of no less force than that which is expressed.”160 Hence, the in153

Id. at 776 (citations omitted).
Stevens, supra note 126, at 457.
155
65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
156
Id. at 140–41.
157
No. HHBCV054008511S, 2007 WL 1019000 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2007),
aff’d, 965 A.2d 633 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
158
Id. at *5.
159
Chamberlin v. Advanced Equities, Inc., No. C01-502R, 2002 WL 34419450, at
*3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2002); see also IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v. Gleacher NatWest Inc.,
No. CIV. 99-116, 2002 WL 373455, at *7 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2002); Houston v. Seward
& Kissel, LLP, No. 07CV6305, 2008 WL 818745, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008).
160
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (quoting
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
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quiry must move to implied preemption, which can occur through
either field preemption or conflict preemption.
1.

Field Preemption

Courts have found field preemption “when Congress ‘so thoroughly occupies a legislative field,’ that it effectively leaves ‘no
room’ for states to regulate conduct in that field.”161 Conversely,
there is no field preemption where Congress has shown “awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and
has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate
whatever tension there [is] between them.”162
NSMIA was Congress’s first of many opportunities to preempt
state regulation of covered BD conduct, and it expressly declined
to do so. NSMIA’s allocation of jurisdiction between federal and
state government was the product of intense cross-lobbying by the
states and the industry, and Congress made a conscious effort
through the years to preserve this balance.163 After NSMIA, states
continued to enforce their misconduct statutes against covered
BDs, and Congress acquiesced.164 Congress had the opportunity to
speak in SLUSA and Sarbanes-Oxley as well as in Dodd-Frank,
where it squarely addressed the issue of BD-provided investment
advice.165 However, it repeatedly chose to affirm the states’ authority to enforce their own antifraud statutes and common law
precedent.166
In Zuri-Invest AG v. NatWest Finance Inc.,167 the court held that
NSMIA did not preempt state common law claims.168 The court
reasoned that although NSMIA’s savings clause does not expressly
address the question, Congress unequivocally expressed that

161
Whistler Invs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159, 1164
(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
162
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 18 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009)).
163
Campbell, supra note 70, at 614.
164
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008)
(“[W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent
of the enacting one, such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so
when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980))).
165
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828–30 (2010).
166
People v. Greenberg, No. 401720/05, 2010 WL 4732745, at *14–15 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 21, 2010).
167
177 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
168
Id. at 191.
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NSMIA does not in any way affect the state’s common law with
respect to fraud and deceit in securities.169 It also observed that
NSMIA did not amend the saving provisions of either the 1933 Act
or the 1934 Act, which affirm that the rights and remedies afforded by the federal law shall be “in addition to any and all other
rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity.”170 Courts
have relied on Zuri to hold that NSMIA allows both state commissioners and private parties to bring state common law claims
against BDs for conduct beyond fraud, including breach of
fiduciary duties.171 Recognizing the states’ authority to bring common law claims against covered BDs while preempting states’
efforts to codify those claims in their statutes would be absurd.
2.

Conflict Preemption

Conflict preemption occurs where a court, considering the federal statute as a whole, determines that (1) it is not possible for
parties to comply with both federal and state requirements, or that
(2) in view of the federal statute’s purpose and intended effects,
the state law “poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s
objectives.”172 Although BD compliance with state-heightened standards ensures that the federal standards are accomplished, onerous compliance costs could conflict with NSMIA’s purpose of
promoting efficient capital markets.173
States cannot enforce their antifraud and unethical conduct
statutes in a manner that is designed to circumvent the limitations imposed by NSMIA, or in a manner that excessively burdens
BD operations.174 Even when the states decide to regulate solely
on antifraud policing grounds, their regulations may create
unintended “books and records” requirements, as BDs need to
document compliance and create systems to supervise the conduct
of their representatives.175

169

Id. at 193–94 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 33–34 (1996)).
Id. at 194 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(a), 78bb(a)(2) (2018)).
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See, e.g., In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., No.
09-2009, 2014 WL 12808159, at *5–6 (W.D. Tenn. July 29, 2014); Scognamillo v.
Credit Suisse First Bos. LLC, No. C03-2061, 2005 WL 8162733, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
1, 2005).
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Whistler Invs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159, 1164
(9th Cir. 2008) (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73
(2000)).
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The holdings in Edward D. Jones and Brown support the
proposition that incidental recordkeeping burdens arising from
state regulations and enforcement actions targeting BD conduct
may be tolerated. However, in Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co.,176
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that claims against a BD
brought under Minnesota’s common law of agency and Minnesota’s consumer protection statutes were impliedly preempted by
federal law because they conflicted with Congress’s and the SEC’s
understanding of efficient capital formation.177 Consequently, if
these “incidental effects” of policing misconduct are too burdensome for the industry, they can hinder the purpose of the statute
and lead to conflict preemption.
IV. NSMIA DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE FIDUCIARY RULES
THAT ARE REASONABLY CONSISTENT WITH THE FIDUCIARY
DUTIES IMPOSED BY JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
In light of NSMIA’s dual purpose, disposition of the current
legal controversy hinges on whether the burdens to market
efficiency outweigh the benefits of added protections to investors.178 As the SEC has noted when it promulgated Reg BI,
preemption of state fiduciary regulations must be assessed on a
case-by-case basis.179 The imposition of statutory fiduciary duties
on BDs does not necessarily create excessive compliance requirements, because courts already find BDs are fiduciaries under
certain circumstances. The impact on the industry depends on the
scope of the duties imposed by the fiduciary rule in question.
State-specific rules that impose IA fiduciary duties on BDs
can create substantial compliance costs for BDs, especially for
those operating on a national level. Unlike smaller, state-based
firms, nationwide firms bear the costs of implementing the fiduciary standards on a national scale, and when some states adopt
higher fiduciary standards, the highest state standard becomes
the rule across the board.180 The more state statutory standards
depart from the federal requirements, the more implementation
costs burden BDs’ nationwide operations, potentially leading to
less affordable options for consumers seeking advice. However,
state statutes that shadow common law fiduciary standards, as
176
177
178
179
180

545 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1996).
Id. at 925.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra text accompanying note 107.
Crawley, supra note 58, at 427–28.
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applied to BDs, would not result in excessive compliance costs.
First, case law precedent has been sensitive to the nature of the
BD business model. Second, both state and nationwide firms were
already subject to those standards. Third, reference to established
common law principles would lead to consistency among statespecific statutes, which would reduce the burdens of regulatory
balkanization. Last, even in states that adopt the strictest BD
fiduciary standards imposed by the common law,181 empirical
studies show that the relatively stricter fiduciary standard of care
does not impact BDs’ ability to provide a broad range of products
and services to consumers.182
States can further moderate the adverse impact on the industry by effectively tailoring the scope of the fiduciary duty and
by clearly defining its triggers. For instance, one of the main
problems facing BDs under some of the proposed rules is that
standalone investment recommendations could trigger IA duties
that include continuous account monitoring. Ongoing account
monitoring conflicts with the BD “transactional” model and could
carry significant compliance costs. State fiduciary rules can eliminate these burdens by limiting the application of the fiduciary
duties to the duration of the transaction.
For example, the rule adopted by Massachusetts acknowledges that BDs often satisfy demands for one-time recommendations that do not rise to the level of continued strategic
advice.183 Consequently, the fiduciary duty imposed by the rule is
limited to the period where the incidental advice is made, and the
advice is only deemed “ongoing” when: (1) the account is discretionary; (2) there is “a contractual fiduciary duty”; or (3) there is
“a contractual obligation to monitor.”184 New Jersey’s proposed
rule contains similar terms, and also imposes an ongoing duty if
the BD is acting as an adviser or is dually registered as an IA.185
181

See supra Section I.B.2.
Michael Finke & Thomas P. Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice, J. FIN. PLANNING, July 2012, at 28, 36, https://
www.financialplanningassociation.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/JUL12%20JFP%20
Finke.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ7Z-5K35].
183
Mass. Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 3–4.
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Both rules impose an ongoing duty to monitor in special circumstances, which is consistent with the precedent established by the
courts in Capital Gains186 and in Leib.187
Massachusetts incorporated breach of fiduciary duties to the
list of BD “conduct [and] practices” deemed “unethical or dishonest” by the state’s securities laws.188 Its rule imposes clearly
defined duties of “utmost care and loyalty” on BDs and their
agents who provide investment advice or recommend investment
strategies, account transfers, or security exchanges.189 The duty of
care as outlined by both Massachusetts and New Jersey requires
that BDs make a “reasonable inquiry” into the “risks, costs, and
conflicts” related to the investment advice they give and consider
the client’s particular circumstances, taking into account “any
other relevant information.”190 The duty of loyalty requires that
BDs make recommendations “without regard to the financial or
any other interest of any party other than the customer.”191 This
standard goes further than Reg BI, because it requires more than
putting a client’s interest first: it requires BD agents to put aside
their personal interests completely when making a recommendation. However, the enhanced fiduciary standard in both rules is
in line with traditional agency law, and it is plainly consistent with
the standard Dodd-Frank contemplated for BDs who give investment advice to retail investors: a standard “no less stringent than
the standard applicable to” IAs under the Advisers Act, requiring
action “without regard to the financial . . . interest of the
broker.”192
The Massachusetts rule engages in a balancing act. Unlike
the New Jersey proposal, the Massachusetts duty of loyalty requires BDs to disclose “all material conflicts of interest,” but it

186

See supra text accompanying notes 49–52.
See supra text accompanying notes 79–82.
188
950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(1).
189
Id. 12.207(1)(a), (2).
190
Id. 12.207(2)(a); Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers, and
Agents, 51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:47A-6.4(b)(1)).
191
See 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(2)(b); Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers,
Investment Advisers, and Agents, 51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN.
CODE § 13:47A-6.4(b)(2)).
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does not impose specific disclosure requirements.193 It also requires BDs to “[m]ake all reasonably practicable efforts” to avoid,
eliminate, or mitigate conflicts of interest, but it allows them to
mitigate those conflicts that are intrinsic to the BD model and
cannot be reasonably avoided.194 The rule only establishes a presumption of breach when BD agents make recommendations in
connection to sales contests.195 Massachusetts’ rule further protects
investors by stating that mere disclosure of conflicts does not
satisfy the duty of loyalty.196 However, in line with established
common law principles of agency, the rule excludes sophisticated
parties such as banks, IAs, and institutional investors from its
scope of operation.197 In sum, Massachusetts (1) imposes IA duties
on BDs when “special circumstances” are present, and (2) shapes
the scope of the duties to preserve the existing BD model.198 For
these reasons, NSMIA should not preempt Massachusetts’s rule.
Nevada’s proposed rule, on the other hand, is problematic.
First, its BD duties are ongoing by default, and BDs must comply
with detailed requirements to avail themselves of an “Episodic
Fiduciary Duty Exemption.”199 Second, the rule establishes a presumption that BDs owe a broad fiduciary duty to their clients, and
then proceeds to enumerate some exceptions—the opposite of the
common law majority rule.200 Third, some portions of the rule are
too broad and result in vagueness, unnecessarily increasing BD
193

950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(2)(b)(1); cf. Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers,
Investment Advisers, and Agents, 51 N.J. Reg. 493(a) (to be codified at N.J. ADMIN.
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liability exposure and related compliance costs.201 Last, unlike the
Massachusetts rule, the Nevada rule requires compliance with
extensive specific disclosures in addition to those required by Reg
BI.202 Because these disclosure requirements add actuarial and
recordkeeping burdens without adding protections to investors,
they are likely preempted.
State regulators can also minimize implied compliance costs
by expressly stating that any books and records requirements arising from the new fiduciary statutes are deemed satisfied through
compliance with the federal requirements in 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i).203
State regulators could similarly avoid conflict preemption risks
arising from the written requirements of FINRA supervisory rule
3110204 by expressly stating that the rule does not establish any
written supervision procedures that differ from, or are in addition
to, those required under federal securities laws and regulations,
and applicable FINRA rules.
To conclude, by effectively tailoring their statutes’ language
and operation, states can boost investor protection beyond the federal law baseline without risking conflict preemption.
V. STATE FIDUCIARY RULES FURTHER PUBLIC TRUST IN THE
MARKETS, WHICH IS KEY TO A HEALTHY ECONOMY
AND GOOD PUBLIC POLICY
When state rules carefully balance the competing interests
embraced by NSMIA, the added protections to investors outweigh
the incidental burdens of duplicative regulation. Moreover, such
state rules can add efficiency to the capital markets in several
ways.
To an individual investor, the cost of conflicted advice on returns
is one percentage point each year.205 To the United States, these
201

See, e.g., id. §§ 2, 5.
Id. § 7. For example, the rule requires disclosure of actual gains. Id. These are
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aggregate costs can add up to $17 billion per year.206 A recent
study of the annuities markets suggests that contracts sold by BDs
with fiduciary duties are about five percent more valuable than
contracts sold by BDs without fiduciary duties.207 A modest annual increase of $1,000 in savings per investor could save the
country “$33 billion on public assistance programs between 2018
and 2032.”208 That is efficient.
If states enforce higher fiduciary standards on BDs providing
investment advice, industry participants will likely find costeffective ways to comply. BDs have strong incentives to continue
providing services in the states where they operate. In Massachusetts, for example, “hundreds of thousands” of consumers who hold
BD accounts seek “episodic brokerage advice.”209 The need for financial advice will continue to rise with the wave of retiring Baby
Boomers.210 BDs are unlikely to walk away from these profitable
markets, especially where state fiduciary rules allow them to
preserve their transaction-based model.
Reliable investment advice is key to healthy capital markets.211
Retail investor interactions with financial advisors are seldom at
arm’s length. The law has traditionally imposed a fiduciary duty
on the dominant party to reduce agency cost risks to the client and
encourage participation: individual investors who do not trust
their financial advisors are less likely to participate in the capital
markets.212 Studies show that in complex societies the level of economic prosperity is directly related to the level of trusting rela-
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tionships between its members.213 As much as investors value
cheaper, transaction-based advice, conflicted advice comes with
hidden costs. From a business perspective, trust is also key to
attracting millennial investors, who have a deep sense of distrust
in the financial services industry and largely chose do-it-yourself
(“DIY”) investment platforms.214 State fiduciary rules that harness the wisdom of common law agency principles encourage and
reward trust in the financial system, which in turn contributes to
market efficiency and capital formation.215
Even when they largely mirror protections afforded to investors by the common law, state fiduciary rules bring added value.
First, they inject predictability into the system. Judicial precedent
applying fiduciary duties to BDs does not define BD duties with
precision and is “widely inconsistent.”216 Many cases are solved
through arbitration, which leads to a paucity of well-reasoned
decisions and contributes to arbitrary fact finding and unpredictable outcomes.217 State fiduciary rules signal to investors that
their financial interests will be protected in consistent ways, and
give BDs concrete guidance on how to effectively avoid liability.
Second, state fiduciary rules incentivize a shift in BD culture.
They reflect investors’ expectation that a BD representative
recommending an investment is not just a salesperson, but
someone who holds a position of high responsibility and integrity.
Moreover, they incentivize the industry to develop low-cost,
quality advice alternatives to the traditional models, which BDs
will need to thrive in a skeptical consumer market that is quickly
shifting to cheap e-platforms and robo advisers.218
The economic efficiency achieved by NSMIA’s strategic allocation of duties between the federal government and the states is
enhanced when states invest more in antifraud enforcement, and
all state efforts to deter unethical conduct should be encouraged.219
The broad purposes of securities laws are served when the federal
213
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and state governments coordinate their efforts to foster corporate
responsibility, transparency, and integrity.
State rules that incorporate the protections traditionally recognized by the common law are better suited than a uniform
federal rule to achieve these goals. Policing misconduct and protecting the public interest are within states’ historical powers.
State autonomy fosters experimentation and more efficient regulations. A state is in a better position than the federal government
to assess the behavior of its citizens as securities consumers, to
detect new deceptive and unethical schemes, and to devise regulations tailored to the specific issues faced by investors in the
state.220
Federal regulators are hesitant to take actions with unpredictable systemic effects on the market, and state innovation reduces
systemic risks while providing concrete data that Congress can
consider in future legislative initiatives.
CONCLUSION
State fiduciary rules are not necessarily preempted by NSMIA
because they fall within the area reserved to the states by
NSMIA’s antifraud savings clause. State common law precedents
imposing fiduciary duties on BDs are not preempted, and allowing
states to enforce their common law fiduciary standards while
preempting their codification of those standards would be absurd.
Congress has acquiesced to state enactment of broad unethical
conduct rules, and state fiduciary rules are a logical outgrowth of
this practice. State fiduciary rules aimed at BD conduct are not
expressly preempted, even if they imply incidental book- and
recordkeeping burdens. However, states should avoid imposing
fiduciary schemes that excessively burden BD operations. Fiduciary rules that (1) impose ongoing monitoring requirements only
when justified by the nature of the broker-client relationship, and
(2) preserve the traditional BD commission-based fee structure
are likely not preempted. Last, allowing states to apply heightened fiduciary standards to the BDs who shape their citizens’
financial future is sound public policy: it preserves efficient
markets and the right of investors to rely on the kind of advice that
will make their choices informed, and free.
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